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NOTES
IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN SERVICE CONTRACTS
I INTRODUCTION
The concept of implied warranties is well established in the law of sales con-
tracts. Such warranties were imposed upon contracts for the sale of goods by the
common law and their application to such contracts has been broadened and their
effect strengthened by the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.'
Many courts have extended the protection afforded by implied warranties even
beyond that which would be afforded under the liberal provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.2 These courts have recognized that changing business practices
and an increasing use of modem day advertising media has necessitated the exten-
sion of such warranties beyond the immediate parties to the contract of sale to
the ultimate consumer.3 Addressing themselves to a related problem, many courts
have also recognized that the increased use of the "standard warranty" or "standard
guaranty" forms by manufacturers and sellers is often merely an attempt to limit
the protection afforded the consumer by limiting all warranties to those contained
in the form, and thus have not given effect to such provisions insofar as they
attempt to prevent the imposition of implied warranties.
4
There is little room for doubt that the courts and state legislative bodies alike
have been striving to extend to the consumer of goods an ever-increasing amount
of protection.' One of the major ways that this protection is being given is
through an increased and more far-reaching application of implied warranties.
With this fact in mind, the purpose of this note is to determine whether the pur-
chaser of services is being as well protected as the consumer of goods and whether
the courts are using implied warranties to protect the purchaser of a service from
loss caused by adverse results in the same manner as they are raising implied war-
ranties to protect the consumer of goods from loss caused by defective merchandise.
Will the man who hires an architect, an engineer, or any other qualified person
to render a particular service for him, and who suffers a loss because of the failure
of the party rendering the service to produce the desired result, be given the same
1 See, e.g., Ezer, Impact of Uniform Commercial Code on California Law of Sales War-
ranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281 (1961) and Note, 38 N.D. LAWYER 555, 604-12 (1963) for
discussions of the increasing application by the courts and by the state legislatures of implied
warranties in the area of sales contracts.
2 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 2d 525, 23 Cal. Rpts. 282
(1962); Harmon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1962); Lee v. Cohrt, 57 S.D. 387,
232 N.W. 900 (1930); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
3 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 2d 525, 23 Cal. Rpts.
282, 284-85 (1962),
The liability of a manufacturer predicated upon representations concern-
ing his product . . . through labels or advertising materials . . . [is] an
obligation attendant upon a new era, which dictates that the manufacturer
should be held responsible to the consuming public for representations mani-
festly made by him to them for the purpose of promoting the sale of his
product .... In any event, the obligation in question, strictly speaking, is
not the result of a contract; is not dependent upon the existence of con-
tractual privity; and exists independently of any buyer-seller relationship.
4 See, e.g., Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) wherein
the New Jersey Supreme Court, after an extensive examination of existing policy considera-
tions, decided that standard warranties which, in effect, act as disclaimers of those obligations
that normally attend a sale are not favored by the better reasoned recent decisions and must be
strictly construed against dealers and manufacturers. See also Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown
Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202, 204 (1954) where the court had to evaluate the
following provision in a conditional sales contract: "This contract contains the entire agree-
ment between the Seller and the Buyer; there are no other representations, warranties or
covenants by either party. This contract may not be modified except in writing." The court
held that the provision did not disclaim implied warranties.
5 See Note, 38 N.D. LAWYER 555 (1963).
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remedy - suit for breach of implied warranty - as is given the consumer who
purchases and is injured by defective merchandise?
II THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
An implied warranty is an obligation imposed by law apart from any con-
tractual provisions existing between the parties.6 Thus, where a housewife pur-
chases a loaf of bread and law imposes upon the seller an implied warranty that
the bread is fit for human consumption;7 where a man purchases a lathe the
law imposes upon the manufacturer and upon the seller an implied warranty that
the lathe is safe under conditions of ordinary and proper usage;8 and where a
prospective purchaser informs a seller who deals in the type of goods in question
of the particular purpose for which he desires such goods, then relies on the seller
to select the proper goods for his needs, the law imposes upon the seller an implied
warranty that the goods selected and sold will be fit for that particular purpose. 9
All of these implied warranties should be imposed regardless of any contractual
disclaimer or limitation of warranties that may exist between the parties to the
contract of sale.10
The imposition of an implied warranty subjects the manufacturer and/or
the seller of the goods in question to strict liability for any loss suffered by a pro-
tected party due to the breach of the warranty. If, for example, the bread sold
to the housewife is not fit for human consumption and she is made sick because
of eating it, an action ex contractu based on breach of implied warranty arises in
her favor against the seller. To sustain this action, the housewife need only prove
that she purchased the bread from the defendant, that she in good faith and with-
out negligence ate it and became ill, and that she suffered damages thereby. She
need not, however, allege or prove that the defendant seller was in any way
negligent in his purchase, display or sale of the bread. The liability resulting from
the imposition of an implied warranty is strict liability for damages suffered because
of the breach of such warranty by parties to whom the Warranty extends. 1
The nature and effect of implied warranties, therefore, extend to the con-
sumer of goods a twofold protection. In the first instance, at least according to
the more well-reasoned decisions, if the circumstances of the sale are such as
warrant the imposition of an implied warranty, the courts will impose it in spite
of contrary provisions in the contract of sale.'2 Thus, the consumer is protected
against an attempt by a manufacturer or seller to strictly limit the obligations
and duties he owes to the consumer. Secondly, the injured consumer is relieved
of the onerous burden of having to prove negligence on the part of the manu-
facturer or seller for he is said to have a contractual action for breach of warranty.8
It is primarily this second manner of protecting the consumer which is important
in determining whether the consumer of services will be protected in the same
manner as is the consumer of goods.
III GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SERVICE CONTRACTS
Examination of those cases dealing with the liability of one who undertakes
to perform a service for another reveals: (1) that the law imposes upon a party
who contracts to render a service for another the obligation to perform the service
with that degree of skill, efficiency and knowledge that is possessed by those of
ordinary skill, competency and standing in the particular trade or profession in
6 See VOLD, SALES § 84 (2d ed. 1959); 1 WILLTSTON, SALES §§ 195-97 (Rev. ed. 1948);
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
7 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 ('1931).
8 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 2d 525, 23 Cal. Rpts. 282
(1962).
9 U).S.A. § 15 (1); U.C.C. § 2-315; Mack v. Coogan, 8 Chest. Co. Rep. 233 (Pa. 1957).
10 Supra note 4.
11- Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
12 Supra note 4.
13 E.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
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which the performer is employed;1 (2) that one who performs a service for another
will be held liable for damages suffered by his employer only when he has failed
to fulfill his obligation to perform in accordance with the standards of his trade
or profession ;15 and (3) that one wh6 contracts to perform a service for another
does not, in the absence of an express agreement, guaranty or warranty the results
of his work.'6 The Alabama case of Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co. Inc.,17 was
the only decision found which directly conflicted with numbers (2) and (3) of
the general pripciples stated above. The Broyles case and its effect on the law
governing service contracts, if any, will be discussed in another section of this
article.
The majority rule is well established: one who employs another to perform
a service for him must, absent the existence of an express guaranty of satisfactory
results, allege and prove that the services were not performed in accordance with
the established trade or professional standards governing the party rendering the
services, before he may be compensated for damages suffered by him because of
the failure of expected results. In an illustrative case,' 8 plaintiff hired defendant,
a "test hole digger," to determine the depth of fill on certain adjoining lots plaintiff
was interested in purchasing. The defendant dug numerous holes and informed
the plaintiff that the fill was from twelve to sixteen inches in depth; plaintiff then
purchased the lots. When construction of an apartment building was begun, fill
to depths of five to six feet was discovered which added materially to plaintiff's
cost of construction. Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant and alleged
breach of implied warranty, negligence and deceit. The trial court sustained all
three allegations and entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of the additional
cost of construction. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed as to
the allegation of breach of implied warranty,19 on the grounds that the contract
involved was one for the performance of a service and:
Thus the general rule is applicable that those who sell their services for
the guidance of others in their economic, financial and personal affairs are
not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct....
[Those who hire experts] purchase service, not insurance.20
The rule stated in Gagne v. Bertrans2 and therein applied to "test hole
drillers," is equally applicable to all who perform services for others. 22 However,
the law in this country was once that the mere negligent rendering of certain
professional services did not subject the party rendering them to any liability.
Lawyers, for example, as late as 1933 were held liable only in the case of gross
14 See, e.g., Bloomsburg Mills Inc. v. Sardoni Construction Co., 401 Pa. 358, 164 A.2d
201 (1960) (Architect); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954) (Attorney);
Duenewald Printing Corp. v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 276 App. Div. 26, 92 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup.
Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.Y. 569, 93 N.E.2d 452 (1950) (Printer); Wilson v. Blair,
65 Mont. 155, 211 P. 289 (1922) (Doctor); Cowles v. City of Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452,
151 N.W. 184 (1915) (Engineer); City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141
N.W.181 (1913) (Accountant).
15 See, e.g., Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442, (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897) (Doctor); Rolins Engine
Co. v. Eastern Forge Co., 73 N.H. 92, 59 A. 382 (1904) (dicta: general reference to all who
perform a service); Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N.W. 62 (1898) (Architect).
16 See, e.g., Bonadiman-McCain, Inc. v. Snow, 183 Cal. App. 2d 58, 6 Cal. Rptr. 52
(1960) (Engineer); Wilson v. Blair, 65 Mont. 155, 211 P. 289 (1922) (Doctor); Looker v.
Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala. 42, 81 So. 832 (1919) (Architect); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331,
41 N.W. 417 (1889) (Attorney).
17 151 So.2d 767 (Ala. 1963).
18 Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
19 Id. at 21. The court upheld the trial court as to its finding of negligence and deceit, but
reversed it as to damages.
20 Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954).
21 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
22 See, e.g., Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897) (Doctor); Hodges v.
Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954) (Attorney); Rolins Engine Co. v. Eastern Forge
Co., 73 N.H. 92, 59 A. 382 (1904) (dicta: general reference to all who perform a service);
Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N.W. 62 (1898) (Architect).
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negligence.23  Architects, too, were immune from suits for negligence. Early
American decisions, following English cases, 24 held that an architect was a quasi-
arbiter and as such was not liable for the damages suffered by those who employed
his services.25 The decisions like W. L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage,21 and the
early architect cases, however, have had little lasting effect on the law governing
service contracts, and the rule of the Gagne case is the position held by the
majority of American courts today.2 7
IV DETERMINATION OF LmaIwzT IN SERVICE CONTRACT CASES:
THE MAjorrY Vmw
In determining whether one who has contracted to render a service has ful-
filled the duty imposed upon him to perform in accordance with the recognized
standards of his trade or profession, the majority of courts will look to the manner
and method of performance and will generally consider the fact of failure of
intended results only as circumstantial evidence of negligent performance.28 Because
one who contracts to perform a service is not, according to the great weight of
authority, held to a guaranty of satisfactory results,29 mere proof of failure of
intended results generally will not, in and of itself, sustain an allegation of negli-
gent performance.30 In one case,3' the plaintiff, an architect, sued his employer
for the value of his services. The employer, alleging negligent performance by
the architect, requested that an instruction be given to the effect that if the plans
and specifications as prepared by the plaintiff were found by the jury to be
faulty and if it was found that because of the faulty plans and specifications the
defendant suffered unnecessary expense in the construction of the building, the
jury should determine the amount of this expense and deduct it from the value
of the services rendered. The trial court refused to grant the instruction and a
verdict for the plaintiff for the full value of his services was returned by the jury.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, stating that, "Mhe request
does not correctly state the law. It makes the architect a warrantor of his plans
and specifications, . . . The law does not imply such a warranty or the guaranty
of the perfections of his plans." 32 As to the services of doctors, the prevailing
view is that except in those cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturs 3 is
applicable, no presumption of negligence is to be derived from the fact of injury
or adverse results of treatment of, or operation on, a patient.3 4
There are two exceptions to this general rule that one who performs a service
will not be held liable for damages suffered by his employer unless it is shown that
he negligently or wilfully failed to fulfill the duty.of due care and diligence imposed
upon him by the law and mere proof of failure of intended result will not per se
sustain an allegation of negligent performance. One is where it is determined
23 See, e.g., W. L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841 (1933).
24 E.g., Stevenson v. Watson, L.R. 4 C.P. Div. 148, 40 L.T.R. (N.S.) 485 (1879).
25 5 AM. JUR. 2d ARBITRATION AND AwARD § 107 (1962).
26 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841 (1933).
27 Supra note 22.
28 E.g., Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N.W. 62 (1898).
29 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
30 E.g., Rolins Engine Co. v. Eastern Forge Co., 73 N.H. 92, 59 A. 382, 384 (1904)
wherein the court stated: "The obligation ... of one who undertakes to perform a service for
another, is due care. He contracts to exercise the diligence and skill of the average man of the
ability which he professes in like work. If he exercises such care, he is not-liable, in the absence
of express contract, merely because the expected result is not obtained."
31 Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N.W. 62 (1898).
32 Id. at 62.
33 Res ipsa loquitur is merely the proposition that an inference of negligence may be raised
without direct evidence of the negligent act if three conditions exist: (1) the injury must be of
a type not ordinarily occurring absent negligence; (2) the defendant must have had exclusive
control of the instrumentality effecting the injury; and (3) the plaintiff must not have con-
tributed to the injury. PossER, TORTS 201 (2d ed. 1955).
34 41 Am. JuR. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 125, 127 (1942).
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that an express guaranty of results was made, and the other is where the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is found to be applicable to the fact situation in question.
In those situations in which an alleged guaranty is found to exist, the party
seeking to recover or setoff damages need not allege negligence at all. The failure
of intended results, in and of itself, constitutes breach of contract. Where, for
example, a doctor contracted to cure, but the patient died from subsequent treat-
ment, the court said that when death occurred there was a breach of contract,
that an action ex contractu arose at that time, and that allegations of negligence
and evidence relative to due care were immaterial.3 5 Especially in the fields of
medicine and its related sciences, contracts wherein the results of service contracts
are guaranteed are uncommon, but they do exist.3 6 At least one court has intimated
that the respectable physician would not enter into a contract where the results
of his services were guaranteed.37
If a doctor makes a contract to effect a cure and fails to do so, he is
liable for breach of contract even though he use the highest possible skill. In-
surance of such a contract could protect only the medical charlatans. The
honorable member of the medical profession is more keenly conscious than
the rest of us that medicine is not an exact science, and he undertakes only
to give his best judgment and skill. He knows he cannot warrant a cure.38
In spite of the language just quoted, a number of courts have found that state-
ments made by physicians to the effect that while the operation might not cure
the hearing problem, it would not worsen it,39 that the radium treatments would
not leave a scar4" and that the injured hand would be made one hundred per cent
perfect,4 constituted express warranties and the failure of the promised results
gave rise to actions for breach of contract. Where a dentist guaranteed to con-
struct two dental plates for plaintiff to her entire satisfaction, and the plates fit
improperly and caused sores in the mouth of plaintiff, the court found a breach
of guaranty; 42 and where an architect told a prospective employer that a building
constructed in accordance with plans prepared by him would be "well and properly
lighted," and "first class in every respect," he was held to an express warranty of
results.43 Damages in cases involving suits for breach of guaranty or express war-
ranty are generally limited to an amount sufficient to place the injured party in
as good a position as he would have been in had the defendant performed his
contract.44 In the case of Carpenter v. Moore,45 the court reversed the judgment
as to damages awarded for the plaintiff's pain and suffering on the grounds that
the amount paid, or promised to be paid, is the limit of recovery in this type of
action, there being no proof of negligence or want of professional skill.46
In those situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,47 or the so-called
"ulterior act" and "common knowledge" doctrines48 are applicable, negligent per-
35 Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940).
36 E.g., Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
37 Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1940).
38 Id. at 95.
39 Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961).
40 Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 Pac. 573 (1923).
41 Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 At. 641 (1929) (dicta).
42 Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958).
43 Niver v. Nash, 7 Wash. 558, 35 P.380 (1893).
44 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (Rev. ed. 1937).
45 51 Wash.2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958).
46 See also Hirsh v. Saflan, 257 App. Div. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1939), wherein the court
said that recovery for breach of contract in medical cases is usually limited to compensation for
consequences that were reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when the contract
was made and which flow naturally from the breach; for example, medical fees and hospital
bills.
47 Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48 See Note, 77 ILuv. L. REv. 333, 345 (1963) wherein the "Ulterior Act" and "Common
Knowledge" doctrines, alleged refinements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, are explained and
examined.
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formance must still be alleged, but the result itself will constitute per se proof of
such negligent performance.49 The difficulty in this area lies in determining in
the first instance whether or not the doctrines are applicable to the fact situation
in question.50 There is conflict as to the applicability of res ipsa. One court
stated:
This doctrine is, however, generally restricted to cases of injuries in-
flicted by a mechanical apparatus or some other inanimate object within
the defendant's exclusive control. It does not ordinarily apply to cases of in-juries caused by the careless act or thoughtless omission of a human being.
It follows, hence, that there is no sound basis for extending it to actions for
negligence against a member of a learned profession. To do otherwise would
practically require him to guarantee success in every case. Such a course
would be contrary to the principles of fairness to the professions and against
the best interests of the public. 51
Although this case dealt with the services of a doctor, and while the court did
find that an express warranty might have been made,52 the quoted language is
a clear indication of the court's feeling that res ipsa has no application to the
cases of service contracts.53 Most courts, however, will apply res ipsa in cases
dealing with service contracts and, more specifically, in cases of medical malpractice,
where the results are such that a layman can conclude as a matter of common
knowledge and observation that due care was not exercised in the performance.54
Res ipsa will not, however, be applied merely on the basis of adverse or unfavor-
able results.55
The classic and perhaps most liberal case applying res ipsa in a medical mal-
practice suit, is the case of Ybarra v. Spangard.5" There the court applied res
ipsa in an action brought against all the attending doctors and nurses where, after
an appendectomy, the plaintiff suffered atrophy of certain muscles but recalled
only feeling two hard objects at his shoulders when placed on the operating table.
It has been suggested, however, that even the California courts have withdrawn
from such a liberal application of this doctrine.57
From the analysis of the cases considered thus far, it would appear that one
who has suffered damages because'of the failure of expected results from services
rendered by a professional man or a tradesman must either show that an express
guaranty of results was made, or show that the services were wilfully or negli-
gently performed in an unskillful or unworkmanlike manner. At least one court,
however, would take exception to this seemingly obvious conclusion.58
49 E.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Where patient suffered
atrophy of certain muscles after an appendectomy, court found that all the doctors and
nurses were guilty of negligent performance of their duty.
50 See Note, 47 M~AQ. L. REv. 239 (1963) for a discussion of many recent medical cases
in which the courts have applied or rejected the res ipsa doctrine.
51 Johnson v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345, 347 (D.D.C. 1957) (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 348 where, in reference to the allegation that the defendant doctor had stated
that the proposed shock treatments would be perfectly safe, the court inferred that if defendant
had not qualified his statement in any way, it might properly be found to be a warranty.
53 This limitation on the applicability of res ipsa is in full accord with Dean Prosser's
views, for he too would limit its application to those cases where the injury was caused by an
instrument within the exclusive control of the defendant. PIOSSER, ToRTs, 201, (2d ed. 1955).
54 E.g., Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal.2d 503, 254 P.2d 520, 524 (1953):
That doctrine (res ipsa) applies in medical malpractice cases only where
a layman is able to say as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
or from the evidence can draw an inference, that the consequences of pro-
fessional treatment were not such as ordinarily would have followed if due
care had been exercised....
55 See, e.g., Sattlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1963) and Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
56 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
57 See Note, 47 ADRQ. L. REv. 239 (1963).
58 Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co., 151 So.2d 767 (Ala. 1963).
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V DETERMINATION OF LIABILITY IN SERVICE CONTRACT CASES:
THE MINORITY VIEW
The Broyles case involved an incorporated group of civil engineers which
entered into a contract with the plaintiffs to render civil engineering services and
to submit plans and specifications for the drainage of a tract of land to be used
in the construction of a housing project. After the defendant's services were per-
formed the tract still remained subject to periodic flooding. The plaintiffs brought
an action against defendant for damages suffered by them as a result of defendant's
breach of an implied warranty of reasonable results. The trial court sustained
defendant's demurrers to each of the allegations of the complaint and the plaintiffs
appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded the action.
In reaching its decision, the court first pointed out that neither negligence
nor the want of due care in the preparation of the plans and specifications was
charged in the complaint. "A breach of implied warranty of adequate results is
the gravemen of each count."59 This is the factor that makes the Broyles case
unique in the law of service contracts. The court then examined the law governing
implied contracts and concluded that: "An implied contract arises where there
are circumstances which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and common
understanding, show a mutual intent to contract."60 With this rule of law guiding
it, the court proceeded to find that because the defendant knew that correct plans
were essential for the proper drainage of the water from the tract, "mhe parties
mutually intended an agreement of guaranty as to the sufficiency and adequacy
of the plans and specifications to accomplish proper and adequate drainage."'
1
A brief examination of the law governing service contracts as it has been applied
to other fields of professional services was then made and the court admitted that
other courts have been "reluctant ' 62 to imply a contract of guaranty or insurance
of favorable results in such situations. In spite of this admission, the court con-
cluded its opinion by saying that the services rendered in this case were different
than other types of professional services63 and that
A contracting civil engineer employed to survey and submit plans and
specifications for drainage of an area of land as here involved, when he
accepts employment, being competent and qualified as he holds himself out
to be, should expect to be charged with a guaranty of reasonable result.
• .64
The theory of law upon which the Broyles case is based is not clear. From
the language used in the beginning of its decision 65 the court seems to base its
result on the finding that an implied in fact contract of guaranty existed between
59 Id. at 770.
60 Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 771.
62 Id. at 771. In light of the analysis of the findings of other courts in the service contract
area, the use of the term "reluctant" appears to be a mild understatement of the facts.
63 The court stated, as to the practice of medicine: "The practice of medicine being to a
great degree experimental, it cannot be said ... that a physician intended, in the absence of
express words, to insure favorable results or a cure." Id. at 771; as to lawyers: "[L]awyers are
dealing with factors that are beyond their control and under such circumstances, common deal-
ings would reasonably suggest the absence of any implied guaranty of results." Id. at 771; as
to architects: "His work is to a certain degree experimental. . . The law of physics, gravity
and the rotation of the earth, must... be taken into account. The texture of the soil, a factor
beyond his control, must be considered. For these reasons and others . . . our courts have not
held architects to a strict accountability of guaranty." Id. at 771-72; as to a civil engineer
employed to locate a government land line: "[H]e is dependent on obtaining a correct starting
point for his survey - a point that is often obscured or is evidenced by misleading or false
marks - marks that are made by someone else. An engineer under such circumstances cannot
ordinarily be expected to guaranty or insure definite and positive results." Id. at 772; but as
to the civil engineering services in question, the court stated: "[A]n engineering survey of
drainage requirements of a tract of land .. . is not entailed with unknown or uncontrollable
topographical or landscape conditions... ." Id. at 772.
64 Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co., 151 So.2d 767, 772 (Ala. 1963).
65 Supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.
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the parties. The language used in the conclusion of the opinion,66 however, indi-
cates that an implied warranty of reasonable results would have been imposed even
if an implied in fact contract was not found to exist. Both of these theories present
certain difficulties. As to the finding of an implied in fact contract of. guaranty,
the court itself was cognizant of the rule that such a finding will be made only
when it is clear that the parties mutually intended to so contract.6 7 The court's
conclusion that the defendant intended to guaranty the results of its services appears
illogical. As to the contention that the law will impose an implied warranty of
satisfactory results upon the contract of one who agrees to perform a service for
another, the court takes a position that it is in direct conflict with the vast majority
of opinions on the question. 6 It would seem that the proper implication to be
drawn from the facts presented to the court in the Broyles case would be that
knowing the law governing service contracts, plaintiff should have required from
defendant a written guaranty of satisfactory results. Upon finding that the plaintiff
did not secure such a provision in the contract, most courts would have probably
declined to read into the agreement a provision that was not placed therein by
the parties themselves, both of whom were legally competent to contract.69
The case of Hill v. Polar Pantries"0 must also be considered at this point.
While it differs from the Broyles case in that the court, because negligence was
alleged and found to exist in the performance, was not faced with the same ques-
tion presented to the court in Broyles, it nevertheless indicates that at least one
other court might apply the same reasoning and reach the same result as the
court in Broyles. Hill involved an action by the owner of a frozen food locker
plant against the architect who prepared the plans for the construction of
the plant and agreed to supervise the construction. Some months after the
plant was completed and put into operation, the cement floor began to crack and
within a short time thereafter the cracking became so serious as to render the
plant unusable. The owner brought suit against the contractor and alleged that
he had negligently failed to prepare adequate plans and had negligently failed to
properly supervise the construction of the plant. Defendant argued that he had
neither installed the freezer unit nor constructed the plant. In a motion for a
directed verdict, the defendant alleged that the evidence was insufficient to show
that he was negligent for there was no proof that the damages resulted from his
services rather than from the negligence of the construction company that installed
the freezer unit and built the plant. The trial court denied defendant's motion
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment was
affirmed, the court stating that there was an implied warranty of the sufficiency
of the plans and specifications for the contemplated purpose and, further, the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of a breach of such warranty.
VI CONCLUSION
As revolutionary as the holding in the Broyles case may appear to be, it is
submitted that it will be strictly limited to those circumstances wherein the court
can make the determination that absolutely no unknown or uncontrollable factors
entered into the performance of the service in question. As the general nature of
the performance involved in the vast majority of service contracts prevents such
a determination, the cases following Broyles will no doubt be few in number. In
all other cases involving suits against tradesmen or professional men for failure
-66 Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
67 Supra note 62 and see 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 328, pp. 288-89.
68 See, e.g., Bonadiman-McCain, Inc. v. Snow, 183 Cal. App.2d 58, 6 Cal. Rptr. 52(1960) ; Wilson v. Blair, 65 Mont. 155, 211 P. 289 (1922) ; Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala.
42, 81 So. 832 (1919); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417 (1889).69 Our Lady of Victory College & Academy v. Maxwell Steel Co., 278 S.W.2d 321 (Tex.
1955).
70 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
688 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
to produce the desired results when rendering a service, the purchaser of that
service will still be bound by the well-established general rule that in the absence
of an express agreement, one who performs a service will not be liable for damages
caused by a failure of expected results unless he has wilfully or negligently failed
to perform those services in accordance with the accepted standards of his trade
or profession. In spite of the holding in the Broyles case, proof of negligent per-
formance, either by direct evidence or through the inference raised by the doctrine
of res ipsa, where applicable, is still a necessary and an integral part of any suit
brought against one who has performed a service where an express guaranty of
the results of that service was not obtained.
Robert M. Hanlon
